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TASHI TSERING, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

A TIBETAN PERSPECTIVE ON
DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION
“The Chinese word
for Tibet, Xizang,
means the “western
treasure house.”
…the trends in recent decades show
that the Chinese
government may
now be successful in what it has
always wanted to
do—to put Tibet on
the escalator to becoming a proﬁtable
resource colony.
Consumer goods on a Lhasa sidewalk

”
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INTRODUCTION

N

ovember 30, 1999 marked a turning point in
global history. Tens of thousands of ordinary
people took to the streets of Seattle to stop the second
round of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Ministerial Conference. This event made one thing
clear—people representing various groups of the
globalized are increasingly critical of the management
and effects of globalization. This incident was also an
historic event for Tibetans—when they took part in
the demonstrations, it marked the ﬁrst time they had
joined a global revolt against globalization.
Why would Tibetans, economically one of the
poorest and least affected peoples of the world, oppose this global phenomenon? There has been very
little attempt to explore this issue; apart from a few
brieﬁng papers, Tibet has not been looked at in the
context of globalization.1 This paper attempts to con-

tribute to the scant literature by providing a Tibetan
perspective on this complex and relevant subject. The
purpose of this paper is a simple one: to articulate
what globalization (and thus development) means to
Tibetans by explicating its implications for Tibet. In
order to achieve this task substantively, it is essential
to see it in a matrix of at least three contexts, which
are presented in three separate sections. Section I
provides a brief discussion of the meaning and nature of the phenomenon of globalization. Section II
presents China’s logic in transitioning to a “market
economy” and the objectives of “developing” Tibet.
Section III explicates the effects of free trade rules
and China’s WTO agreements on Tibet. The paper
concludes with certain policy recommendations and
suggestions for further research.
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SECTION I: GLOBALIZATION
Meaning and deﬁnition:
Globalization is seen differently by different people. It is
commonly understood as a phenomenon of intensiﬁcation
of international trade due to improvements in technology
and ﬁnancial systems, and the resulting expansion of
markets—economic globalization. However, the experience
from the last few decades of intensiﬁed globalization makes
it clear that the forces driving globalization, its impacts,
and its implications reach far beyond economics.2 Canada’s
implementation of two international environmental
agreements, for example, has been successfully challenged
under NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)
Chapter 11 by U.S. companies, and Canada will soon be
ordered to pay damages to U.S. investors in both cases.
Globalization as a process of trade and commerce, the
spread of cultural inﬂuences, and dissemination of knowledge and understanding between nations and peoples is an
ancient phenomenon. The perception of, and the debate over
globalization, however, is a recent phenomenon; it is only in
recent decades that world trade has expanded so widely and
intensively, and has become so structurally interdependent
that the use of word “global,” as distinct from “international”
has become justiﬁed.3 Therefore, for analytic purposes of this
paper, we shall refer to globalization as the post World War II
wave of intensiﬁed world trade led by the free trade doctrine.
This analytic deﬁnition is suitable for our purposes because,
as we shall see, it is the rules of this new wave of globalization that will impact the Tibetan people as a consequence of
China’s WTO accession.
One of the deﬁning aspects of globalization in the recent
decades is the spread of neoliberal policies, also called neoorthodox policies, guided by free trade doctrine.4 Following
the footsteps of powerful Western economies like the US
and England, governments around the globe are adopting
policies that emphasize deregulation and privatization, and a
minimum role of government in the market. Another deﬁning feature of this wave of globalization is the institutional
involvement in the free trade regime. The role of international institutions like the WTO, IMF (International Monetary Fund), and the World Bank and their centralized global
trade bureaucracy has become very signiﬁcant in managing
the world economy.5 For example, as of January 1, 2002, 144
economies, including all the major military and economic
powers of the world, have joined the WTO, agreeing to conform to the rules of the free trade regime.6 Presumably, these
institutions facilitate a “level playing ﬁeld” for countries, or
businesses to trade under a single set of rules. But what it
means for small Tibetan businesses is that they will have to
compete with Chinese and powerful Western corporations
in a “free market” environment.
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Backlash of globalization for Tibetan society
Globalization, then, is a result of a renewed global faith
in certain mercantilistic theories of such early British free
trade advocates as Cobden, Ricardo and Adam Smith. What
is frightening, and laughable at the same time, is the fact
that these economic theories are taken to be infallible,
ignoring their long list of assumptions, among these that
their application will result in proﬁt for all parties. For
example, based on the theory of comparative advantage,
international trade is supposed to be a mutually beneﬁcial
transaction between countries. In its simplest form, the logic
of this theory dictates that a country should buy low and
sell high regardless of a product’s importance to the local
culture and economy.7 Thus, applying this theory to Tibet,
if barley (the staple food crop of Tibetans for centuries)
can be imported at less expense than the cost of domestic
production, Tibet should stop domestic barley production,
buy barley from wherever, and sell products that it can
produce more economically than others, i.e., focus on the
production and sale of raw materials like timber, wool, oil,
minerals, etc. This way, it is theorized, all parties can proﬁt
from trade. It is interesting to note, however, that the world
has chosen to ignore certain other economic theories that
appeared at the same time. For example, the Iron Law of
Wages by David Ricardo8, the very person credited to have
developed the theory of comparative advantage, states that
the natural price of labor will be the amount that permits
bare subsistence plus enough to reproduce. No wonder
labor groups were amongst the most vocal demonstrators in
Seattle. Free trade, as critics argue, has today become a carte
blanche for multinational corporations to exploit cheap labor
wherever they can ﬁnd it.
In the view of this paper (and beyond), the more important
aspect of globalization is the utter absence of moral ideals
about social justice and environmental stewardship in its
guiding principles. Not only do the Tibetan people have every
reason to be concerned about the various negative impacts
of globalization like abuse of workers’ rights, environmental
degradation, privatization of health and other social services,
increased poverty, loss of autonomy, and others, they also see
their fundamental cultural and religious belief systems under assault.9 The Tibetan view of “reality” and their attitude
towards nature is different from the frontier mentality that
drives globalization. Globalization is driven by an ideology
of unlimited production and consumption (hence unlimited
growth) that views nature as something to be exploited or
conquered by mankind. This ideology that sees nature as
existing separate from “man” is fundamentally counter to
Tibetan (Buddhist) thinking which views humans as an integral part of nature or the environment in which they live. In
fact, the Tibetan word for environment, Khoryug, is a recently coined term. In traditional Tibetan society there was never

a need for such a word. “Environment,” to Tibetans, was not
something “out there” to be exploited, or saved: people were
a part of the environment. These values are now at risk of being lost as globalization leads to accumulation of power not
just in terms of capital but also in knowledge, amongst other
forms.10 For example, globalization undermines the value of
local diversity and offers legitimacy to the dominant liberal
agenda.
William Greider describes globalization as a machine that
“throws off enormous wealth and bounty while it also leaves
behind great furrows of wreckage.”11 Most
often, the people who reap the bountiful
wealth are the already rich (and powerful), and the ones who are left behind
to live in the wreckage are the common
citizens, with the disenfranchised peoples most adversely affected. Tibetans
are such a people—a people who do not
have say in the policies that sculpt their
future. While free trade rules promise to
bring technology and investments into
their land, there are no mechanisms or
provisions to protect them from exploitation by powerful self-interested foreign
investors, whether American, European,
Japanese, or Chinese. Tibetan people’s
concerns stem from the understanding that globalization is a double edged
sword and that they will be, to a large
extent, on the losing side under present Beggar on street in Lhasa
Chinese government policies.

SECTION II: TIBET UNDER CHINA’S TRANSITION
TO A “MARKET ECONOMY”
China’s race to globalization
Unlike what the neoliberals say about globalization’s impacts
on sovereignty, Chinese leaders see it in highly state-centric
and state-empowering terms.12 Globalization, (quanqiuhua),
it is safe to say, is China’s main long-term geo-economic
and, by extension, geopolitical strategy for making China
rich and strong.13 Beijing has made an uncodiﬁed deal with
the Chinese people, a social contract, to deliver economic
growth in return for the single party’s (Chinese Communist
Party) unquestioned rule.14
Behind People’s Republic of China’s “miraculous” economic growth since it opened it borders for international trade
(late 1970s) lies a different, less-told reality. Although China
has been undertaking a series of “reforms” and restructuring
of its economic system to be more compatible with rapidly
changing global markets and other forces of globalization,

deep structural imperfections abound in China, hindering
its transformation to an efﬁcient “market economy with
Chinese characteristics.” Its banking system, for example, is
considered one of Asia’s weakest and its legal system requires
profound changes to become independent of the government.15 Both the greed of Western businesses that see China
as a vast consumer market for their products, and the fear
of “Western Realists” who propagate the notion of a “China
Threat,” are ill founded. Rising inequality, rampant corruption, soaring unemployment, over 100,000 inefﬁcient industrial SOEs (state owned enterprises) that
employ more than half its work force,16
water scarcity and pollution (amongst
the major environmental concerns), and
bad loans are some of deeper systemic
problems obscured by China’s quadrupled GDP (Gross Domestic Product).17
Although it would be an exaggeration to
say China is on the brink of a social revolution, its leaders no doubt have a number of very serious problems to deal with
more pressing than the misperceptions
of Western businesses and Realists.
To ensure long-term “stability of
the motherland” the Chinese leaders
launched the Western Development
Campaign in June 1999.18 Jiang Zemin
explicitly said that the campaign “has
major signiﬁcance for the future prosperP HOTO: TASHI TSERING ity of the country and the [Party’s] long
reign and perennial stability.”19 Chinese
strategists see the campaign as a means to reduce regional
economic disparities and consolidate its control over Tibet
and other politically sensitive and strategically important
inner regions. The launch of this campaign can be seen as
opportune in light of China’s WTO accession: China’s plan
to ‘develop’ its west is an old one which heretofore could not
be implemented mainly due to lack of capital and technology. It now aims to do that in collaboration with Western
businesses, or more accurately, by using their capital and
technology. And Tibet is a key focus of the campaign.
The objectives of “developing” Tibet
Based on Chinese macro-economic statistics, there has
been incredible economic growth in Tibet since the military
invasion in 1949.20 Ofﬁcial statistics show Tibet Autonomous
Region’s GDP growth averaging 12.8% per annum from
1994-1995,21 with a rapidly expanding tertiary sector.22
However, there are two key critical perspectives to these
ﬁgures. One is the tradition of manufacturing favorable
statistics by ofﬁcials trying to advance their careers— a
common practice in Chinese bureaucratic politics.23 And the
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second is the fact that a substantial part of TAR’s GDP ﬁgures
developing these resources.28 Among the more recent conare investments in large-scale infrastructure and ﬁxed assets,
cerns expressed by the exiled Tibetan government include
which are not based on local needs.24 What are really needed
the Chinese government’s increasing exploration and extracare investments in education and health services—TAR’s
tion of Tibet’s oil and natural gas reserves, and the construchuman development index (including life expectancy index
tion of a railway line connecting Beijing to Lhasa.29 They
and education index) is the poorest/lowest among China’s
have already started constructing pipelines to transport oil
31 provinces.25 This is why there is a dichotomy between
and natural gas to energy-thirsty East China in collaboration
Chinese government’s rosy picture and the exiled Tibetans’
with Western companies.30 Almost all of these projects facilirefutation that the beneﬁts of these “development” projects
tate a supply of raw materials (and fuel) to meet the growing
do not go to the Tibetans.26
demands of China’s mammoth
The main objective of “deeconomy. Functionally, China
veloping” Tibet is political.
uses Tibet as a resource exThe most striking example of
traction colony.
Chinese development projects
The moral economy of Tibet
inside Tibet is the recently
The dichotomy between the
completed Gormo-Lhasa railtwo positions is also due to the
way. This project is estimated
lifestyle and economic realities
to cost $3 billion, which, acof Tibet. Tibetans are a “people
cording to the Washingtonwho have developed a respectbased International Campaign
ful use of the natural resources
for Tibet, “is more than double
and consequently a committhe combined total spent on
ment to creating and preserveducation and healthcare by
ing a technology that interacts
the Tibet Autonomous Region
with local ecosystems in a susgovernment in the last 50
tainable manner.”31 Even toyears.” Jiang Zemin, the then
day, more than three quarters
President of China, was reof Tibetans are engaged in agported by the New York Times
riculture, pastoralism, and noin August 2001 as saying of the
madic life.32 Tibet’s vast area,
Gormo-Lhasa railway, “Some
P HOTO: TASHI TSERING low density of population, auspeople advised me not to go Construction of Tibetan Railway connecting Lhasa with China
tere technology, and Buddhist
ahead with this project because
culture have resulted in a way
it is not commercially viable. I
of life that skillfully makes use of the few hands available, to
said this is a political decision.” The Railway serves China’s
maintain a high level of productivity, with sustainable use
political objective to develop Tibet—to assimilate Tibet and
of the local resources. China has ignored these aspects of
its people into the “Chinese motherland.”
traditional Tibetan subsistence economy, and has imposed
The Chinese government prefers to view development
another economy on top, with “no roots and few linkages
from a statist perspective, concerned with making the
to the traditional economy. There is very little processing of
“motherland” strong and stable, even at the cost of basic conTibetan wool into garments, skins into shoes, milk to cheese
stitutional rights of “ethnic minorities.” The Tibetan people’s
suited to distant markets. Even the Lhasa beer factory relies
opposition comes from a nationalistic perspective, as they
on strains of barley developed by Chinese scientists rather
struggle under an oppressive regime, whose developmental
than using traditional one.”33 The modern large-scale infrapolicies are a death warrant to their national and cultural
structural economy is overwhelmingly urban, concentrated
identity.
in Chinese towns and cities and along the transport corriBeijing’s primary economic objective of investment in Tidors connecting them, and the beneﬁciaries are overwhelmbet is to exploit its rich natural resources. The Tibetan Plaingly Chinese.
teau—the geographical span of which (2.5 million square
With few linkages between the two economies, the rapidly
kilometers) roughly constitutes “ethnographic” Tibet—is
growing modern economy impinges upon the livelihood of
rich in mineral resources.27 For example, just in the central
the majority of Tibetans. For example, Tibetan herders and
and western areas of Tibet, Chinese experts have estimated
nomads require vast open grasslands for their lifestyle. With
mineral reserves worth US$ 81.3 billion, and the Chinese
increasing numbers of Chinese coming into Tibet, there are
government is investing US$ 1.25 billion in prospecting and
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more and more fences, and more and more regulations. Consequently, they are encouraged to give up their traditional
lifestyle and to settle at one place. Cooke and Marshall identiﬁed four negative economic and ecological consequences of
such policies.34 These are: a) reduction in pastoralists’ claim
to their land and its uses; b) increase in land degradation
through overgrazing; c) opening former pastoral land for
mining; and d) forcing former self-sufﬁcient nomads to be
dependent on markets.35 These also mean loss of cultural
and economic autonomy. To make these negative trends
worse for the Tibetan people, globalization will give Chinese
and foreign businesses “legal” tools in the form of free trade
rules and WTO agreements that will efﬁciently marginalize
Tibetans in their own land.

very likely to happen is that companies will claim patents
for the different plants and herbs endemic to Tibet, especially those that have been used by Tibetans for medicinal
purposes for generations. Tibetans could lose opportunities
to make proﬁts from their rich knowledge of the medicinal
properties of various plants and other materials that they
have developed through centuries of practice. Such a situation is also not without precedent. American and Japanese
multinational companies have received patents on different
products made from the neem tree, which the indigenous
people of India have been using for hundreds of years.41 The
lack of legal expertise and ﬁnance will leave Tibetans not
just unable to get patents but also disadvantaged in availing
themselves of other beneﬁts of the WTO, like its infamous
dispute resolution provisions.=

SECTION III: IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S WTO
OBLIGATIONS FOR TIBET

CONCLUSION

Of the current WTO agreements, the Agreement on
Agriculture (AoA) could have the most direct impact on the
Tibetans, as more than three quarters of them are engaged
in the agricultural sector, most practicing pastoralism.36 AoA
requires governments to reduce trade distortions (reduce
tariffs and subsidies) and allow minimum market access. The
dumping of cheap agricultural produce by the large foreign
agribusinesses could shrink existing Tibetan markets. Until
now such arguments have had little relevance because of the
absence of transport infrastructure. But this fast developing
sector, most notably the railway connecting Beijing to Lhasa,
makes such outcomes possible. And the lifting of domestic
subsidies could result in increased costs of production for
Tibetan farmers.
Another important WTO agreement with major implications for Tibet is Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs).
One of the most controversial Uruguay Round Agreements,
TRIPs “requires that WTO member countries protect nonbiological and microbiological processes for the production
of plants and animals, meaning that plants and animals are
patentable if they are cloned or genetically altered.”37 Companies can patent the genetic make-up of the plant if they
claim that they have “discovered” the gene structure.38 Depending on proﬁtability, it is conceivable that a ﬁrm could,
for example, claim a patent for “Tsampa” (staple food of Tibetans made from barley). The patenting of “Basmati” rice
by the Texas-based ﬁrm RiceTec is an example that justiﬁes
concerns from indigenous people like Tibetans.39 Farmers in
India and Pakistan have grown Basmati rice for generations,
yet RiceTec was granted a patent for making a slight alteration to it.
The danger of appropriation of Tibetan intellectual property is enormous, as Chinese scientists have been studying,
analyzing, and labeling Tibet’s genetic diversity.40 What is

The Chinese word for Tibet, Xizang, means the “western
treasure house.” Despite China’s unrestrained attempts
to take advantage of the “treasure house,” Tibet’s harsh
geographical conditions and paucity of human labor,
transport infrastructure, modern technology and capital
have made it extremely challenging and expensive to exploit
its resources proﬁtably. These conditions have kept most
of Tibet economically isolated except for certain areas of
northeast Amdo.43 Therefore, Tibet is one of the few places
of the world today that is not integrated into the global
economy. However, the trends in recent decades show that
the Chinese government may now be successful in what it
has always wanted to do—to put Tibet on the escalator to
becoming a proﬁtable resource colony.
This essay does not deny the development that China has
brought into Tibet. It is possible to chat online or to “buzz”
someone on a mobile phone in Tibet today. However, what
goes on in the name of “development” in Tibet, as in many
economically poorer countries in today’s world of globalization, is a direct result of decisions imposed by foreigners,
based on their economic and political interests. The absence
of control over policies that sculpt their short and long-term
prospects, or even forums for free discussion of government
policies, is perhaps at the heart of Tibetan people’s opposition to the so-called development that is sweeping their land.
Neither Chinese law nor free trade rules ensure Tibetans any
rights to discuss and debate policies, or negotiate terms of
agreements with foreign investors.
To the Tibetans, globalization represents another framework for exploitation, imposed upon them by China, without
their approval or knowledge. This phenomenon will further
constrict their opportunities for economic, cultural, and political development by compounding the severe inequalities
of power and resources already in place. Globalization comes
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to Tibet at Chinese invitation and under Chinese terms to
fulﬁll Chinese goals. Tibetans in Tibet are forced to be silent
witnesses as big Western companies like British Petroleum
(BP) and Exxon invest on their land under “free trade” rules
to do business with dummy corporations like PetroChina,
which are created and run by the Chinese government to
give a privately owned
appearance for Western
investors.44
The
observations
made in this paper have
important policy implications for the Tibetan
government-in-exile.
Perhaps it should reassess its proposal for
“genuine
autonomy.”
Under the framework of
“genuine autonomy” that
the exiled government
has proposed to China
(and later made nonbinding), Tibet’s foreign
affairs and, by extension, the terms of international trade, would be The new Lhasa
under Chinese control.
Such an arrangement would not address some of the broader
concerns expressed here. Therefore, the view of this paper
would support the request made by the Tibetan delegation
at the Asia Paciﬁc People’s Assembly that their government
“strengthen its position regarding negotiation with China
and claim its legitimate right to fully control its foreign affairs and to choose i[t]s economic model.”45
Further research recommendations
This essay provides explanations for the polarized Tibetan and
Chinese positions on Tibet’s contemporary developmental
discourse. To bridge the dichotomy between the Chinese
government’s statist position and Tibetan nationalist concerns,
or in other words to carry this developmental debate beyond
traditional Tibet-China politics, scholars and leaders will do
well to emphasize not just the pursuit of the national interest
but also fulﬁllment of human development and security.46
From the human security perspective, developmental
discourse (and politics) must shift its emphasis (or rather
overemphasis) from statist or nationalistic goals to meeting
basic human needs, creating a condition of existence in
which human dignity, including meaningful participation
in the life of the community is realized. Instead of relying
on economic statistics to measure development, the human
development approach provides an alternative by stressing
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the quality of life, as measured by social statistics such as
infant mortality, literacy, access to health care, etc.47
One World, Ready or Not, warned William Grieder, and
Tibetans are not ready to face this forthcoming challenge.
Unfortunately, there are no programs that would educate
Tibetan people about the new free trade rules and their implications for their livelihood. Work is needed
to identify appropriate
economic niches for
Tibetans (particularly
farmers and herders) in
a more competitive “free
market” environment; to
provide them with training (in employable skills)
and tools (e.g., small
loans for investment in
new income-generating
activities); to identify
foreign business opportunities for these people;
to assess how Tibetans
in Tibet view modernization; and to identify
P HOTO: TASHI TSERING their speciﬁc developmental socio-economic
concerns—short as well as long term. Efforts must also be
made to ﬁll in the severe lack of data on all aspects of Tibet’s
economy in order to plan for a future that provides for the
needs of Tibetans.
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